Bridging Traditions: Alchemy, Chemistry, and Paracelsian Practices in the Early Modern Era
Susan B. Christopher S. Frances Timbers. Karen Hunger Parshall.
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Barbara B. Francesco Guicciardini. Robert Bates Graber. Kirsten C. Gale E. Christianson: Isaac Newton and the Scientific Revolution , rev. Oswaldus Crollius: De Signaturis internis rerum, ed. Fellmann and G. Mikhajlov, rev. Benson, trans. David R. Michael J. Crowe; David R. Dyck; James J. Jackson, and Ole Knudsen, rev. Ronald L. Numbers: Darwinism Comes to America , rev. John I.
Robert F. Donald H. Nikolai Krementsov: Stalinist Science , rev.
Donald E. Gerit von Leitner: Wollen wir unsere Hande in Unschuld waschen? Gertrud Woker , Chemikerin und Internationale Frauenliga , rev. Ellis L. Yochelson: Charles Doolittle Walcott: Paleontologist , rev. Errol C. We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events or situations which we witnessed at the time when they occurred or obtained. The present paper explores the role which such "autobiographically past-directed emotions" or "APD-emotions" play in a subject's mental life.
A defender of the "Memory-Claim" holds that an APD-emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred or the situation obtained towards which the APD-emotion is On this view, APD-emotions might play an important role in our acquiring knowledge about our own past emotions, which renders the view rather attractive.
However, as I show in the present paper, none of the various possible versions of the Memory-Claim are tenable. This leaves us with the "Universal-New-Emotion-Claim", according to which all APD-emotions are new emotional responses to the past events or situations towards which the relevant APD-emotions are directed. Further consideration of the "Universal-New-Emotion-Claim" shows that while APD-emotions do not play the epistemological role they could have played had some version of the Memory-Claim turned out to be true, a subject's APD-emotions nevertheless do play a vital role in a subject's mental life: they help the subject to develop a balanced sense of self.
Classifying Emotions in Philosophy of Mind. Objects and Contents of Emotions in Philosophy of Mind. Direct download 8 more. This special issue on network ethics offers 15 scholarly articles from a variety of disciplines and fields of study, all aimed at exploring some important aspect of how networks develop, enact, and enforce ethical norms.
Taken together, these articles provide a fresh look at how networks are changing the way business is done and the way we think about ethics. Social Epistemology in Epistemology. Science, Logic, and Mathematics. The objective of this study is to reach a deeper understanding of the nature of the motivations behind social practices used by firms. The motivation-mix model is a proposal that attempts to classify the different reasons that may motivate the use of each practice.
The article proposes that this motivation-mix can be examined as intrafirm, indicating a particular combination for each social practice within each firm, at a given moment. The article argues that the aggregate of motivation-mixes for all social The author applies the concept of motivation-mix to business community involvement practices as an illustration.
Imagination and Memory in Philosophy of Mind. Mineral species are, at first glance, an excellent candidate for an ideal set of natural kinds somewhere beyond the periodic table. Mineralogists have a detailed set of rules and formal procedure for ratifying new species, and minerals are a less messy subject matter than biological species, psychological disorders, or even chemicals more broadly—all areas of taxonomy where the status of species as natural kinds has been disputed.
After explaining how philosophers have tended to get mineralogy wrong in discussions of natural They are defined on the basis of human intentionality, not merely natural distinctions. While this is a regrettable outcome to those of us who like the idea of science relying on natural kinds, I contend that mineralogy is doing just fine without a natural kind-based taxonomy, and may in fact be better off without one.
Philosophy of Chemistry in Philosophy of Physical Science. Cognitive Sciences. The present paper considers the question whether, and if so how, a subject's full attention to an object which she interacts with might have value. More specifically, I defend the claim that in order for a subject's activity to have value, it is sufficient that the subject give her full attention to the object towards which the activity is directed.
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Attention in Philosophy of Mind. Socrates in Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy. History of Science in General Philosophy of Science. A recent article by Burch-Brown and Archer provides compelling arguments that biodiversity is either a natural kind or a pragmatically-valid scientific entity.
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I call into question three of these arguments. The first argument contends that biodiversity is a Homeostatic Property Cluster. I respond that there is no plausible homeostatic mechanism that would make biodiversity an HPC natural kind. The second argument proposes that biodiversity is a multiply-realizable functional kind. I respond that there is no shared function to ground this account.
The final, and strongest, argument, is that biodiversity is an ineliminable explanans and explanandum in various subdisciplines of biology. I argue that once we look at the details of the relevant research, not only does biodiversity in a broad sense not function in explanatory roles, but we must eliminate biodiversity in favor of more specific concepts in order to make sense of the leading explanations in contemporary ecology and conservation science.
Scientific Revolutions in General Philosophy of Science. Imagination in Philosophy of Mind.
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This ability of mental self-regulation has been rather neglected by contemporary philosophers of mind, but I show why it deserves careful philosophical attention. In order to further our understanding of the nature of In developing those conditions we find that compared to the physical realm, our mental lives are a rather elusive domain in the face of attempts at intervention, and our ability to intervene in our own mental lives is rather fragile.
We also find that our ability to regulate our own mental lives in many cases depends on our possession of mental skills and mental know-how.
Both these observations in turn throw new light on our understanding of the nature of the human mind. History of Biology in Philosophy of Biology. Seventeenth-century philosopher Margaret Cavendish wrote not only several philosophical treatises, but also many fictional works. I argue for taking the latter as serious objects of study for historians of philosophy, and sketch a method for doing so.